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Abstract
This paper evaluates inflation targeting and assesses its merits by comparing alternative targets in a macroeconomic model. We use European aggregate
data to evaluate the performance of alternative policy rules under alternative inflation targets in terms of output losses. We employ two major alternative policy
rules, forward-looking and spontaneous adjustment, and three alternative inflation
targets, zero percent, two percent, and four percent inflation rates. The simulation findings suggest that forward-looking rules contributed to macroeconomic
stability and increase monetary policy credibility. The superiority of a positive
inflation target, in terms of output losses, emerges for the aggregate data. The
same methodology, when applied to individual countries, however, suggests that
country-specific flexible inflation targeting can improve employment prospects in
Europe.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: E31, E32, E37, E52
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Inflation Targeting and Output Growth: Evidence from
Aggregate European Data

1. Introduction
Inflation targeting (a regime that identifies price stability as the primary objective with
(Svensson, 1999a) or without (King, 1997) considering output gaps), has received
considerable attention in recent years.1 A large volume of academic papers has appeared
and many countries introduced such a design or monetary policy2. In other words, the
monetary authorities commit themselves under inflation targeting to keep inflation close
to an explicit target (Ruge-Murcia, 2003). New Zealand first adopted an inflation
targeting policy regime. Canada, the U.K., and Australia followed. Schaechter et al.
(2000) and Corbo et al. (2001) identify over 15 countries that possess experience with
inflation targeting. Bernanke et al. (1999) and Corbo et al. (2001) review the experience
gained with inflation targeting. The wide acceptance of the inflation targeting
methodology reflects the need to avoid credibility problems from a discretionary policy
(Walsh, 1995; Svensson, 1997a), and the role inflation targeting plays in setting
monetary policy instruments (Bernanke and Woodford, 1997; Svensson, 1997b, 2000;
Ball, 1997).
Svensson (1999a) defines two types of inflation targeting – strict and flexible
inflation targeting. Strict inflation targeting implies that the monetary authorities only
attempt to reduce the variability of the inflation rate around its target level. No other
variable beyond the inflation variability around its target enters the monetary
authorities’ objective function. Flexible inflation targeting allows other variables to
enter the policy makers’ objective function, usually the variability of the output gap
around its target of zero. In other words, flexible inflation targeting places non-zero
weights on variables in addition to the variability of inflation around its target. We
adopt flexible inflation targeting.
To achieve success in their targeting program, the monetary authorities must
employ some policy reaction function. Such reaction functions come in many different
forms, such as the Taylor (1993) rule for the interest rate. Central banks employ an
interest rate instrument to implement their policies, which votes in favor of the Taylor
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rule. The original Taylor rule caused the nominal interest rate to respond to deviations
of the inflation rate from its target level and to deviations of the output gap from zero.
Taylor (1993) initially chooses parameter values for his rule so that the predicted
movements in the interest rate mimicked actual movements. That is, he backed out the
implied parameter values that must hold if the monetary authorities actually employed
his interest rate rule, given the actual movements in the interest rate, the inflation rate,
and the output gap. Since that original work, other researchers have estimated the
implicit Taylor rule for different sample periods, for different precise formulations of
the rule, and for different countries.
Serious criticisms of inflation targeting exist. Since monetary policy affects
inflation only with a lag, the monitoring of inflation performance is a difficult task
(Svensson, 1997b). Others argue that inflation targeting is suboptimal since it is better
to tolerate some, albeit low, inflation than to bear the social cost associated with price
stability. In other words, what is the -optimal inflation rate-?. This question relates to
Howitt’s Rule (Howitt, 1990) whereby the benefits from reduced inflation must offset
the costs of achieving such lower inflation. Howitt concludes that the optimal target
inflation rate exceeds zero, since moderate rates of inflation enhance economic welfare.
That is, small positive inflation permits downward real wage movements with sticky
nominal wages, a common feature of most European economies (Aiyagari, 1990;
Thornton, 1996). Nevertheless, a credible monetary policy minimizes (or even
eliminates) any costs associated with price stability or inflation targeting (Blinder,
1989). In addition, Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2000) and Arestis et al. (2002) argue that
inflation targeting and inflation variability associated inversely and output variability
falls far less in inflation-targeting countries.
Central banks substantially improved their credibility when under inflation
targeting. This last point implies that central banks must improve their accountability,
transparency and communication (Svensson, 1999b). Most relevant studies consider the
performance of inflation, the credibility of monetary policy, and the magnitude of the
sacrifice ratio (i.e. the cost of lowering inflation) under inflation targeting. The majority
of studies demonstrate that inflation targeting does not improve inflation performance
much, lower the cost of inflation, or raise the credibility of monetary authorities
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(Cecchetti and Ehrmann, 2000). By contrast, Ammer and Freeman (1995), Freeman and
Willis (1995), and Mishkin and Posen (1997) present evidence that inflation
performance improves significantly under inflation targeting. The evidence on the effect
on the sacrifice ratio is rather mixed, however. Inflation targeting performed well in
New Zealand and the U.K., but not so well in Canada. In terms of credibility, inflation
targeting obliges the central bank to safeguard its credibility in pursuing the inflation
goal. Therefore, in inflation-targeting countries central banks possess much operational
independence. Regarding credibility, the aforementioned studies show that inflation
targeting does not cause long lasting effects on long-term interest rates. Kahn and
Parrish (1998), however, provide contrary results for New Zealand and Canada, two
inflation-targeting countries. Finally, Siklos (1999) finds mixed evidence -inflation
targeting improves inflation performance in Australia, Canada, and Sweden, but does
not do improve performance in Finland, New Zealand, Spain, and the U.K.
Despite the popularity of inflation targeting among policy makers, most early
studies find little evidence that economic performance in non-inflation-targeting
countries suffer because they did not adopt inflation targeting. More recent studies,
however, unearth significant differences in the performance of the two group countries.
Levin et al. (2004) find that inflation targeting affects the public’s expectations about
inflation. In an inflation-targeting regime, the target inflation rate anchors expectations
about inflation (mostly at longer horizons). Therefore, inflation expectations respond
less to changes in actual inflation. That outcome pays substantial benefits to the
economy, since expected inflation gets negotiated into various sorts of pricing contracts,
such as labor contracts. Thus, the public’s expected inflation can produce a selffulfilling outcome. As such anchoring inflation expectations anchored to target inflation
keeps inflation itself low and stable. Moreover, despite some mixed empirical support
for inflation targeting, many academics argue in favor of inflation targeting (Bernanke
et al., 1999; Alesina et al., 2001). Recently, Neumann and von Hagen (2002) confirm
that although inflation targeting does not clearly outperform monetary aggregate
strategies, it still matters. By contrast, specific drawbacks to the adoption of inflation
targeting exist. For example, an inflation-targeting regime removes the flexibility
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needed by policy makers to respond to changing macroeconomic conditions and
unusual unexpected events.
The majority of studies on monetary rules have analyzed the impact of inflation
targeting on the U.S. economy. Excluding the paper by Peersman and Smets (1999), this
paper evaluates inflation targeting performance using alternative optimal interest rate
rules in a simple macroeconomic model for the European Union (EU). Within the EU
the European Central Bank (ECB) strategy followed is to focus on the price stability
objective through a year-on-year increase of the price level below 2 percent (Issing et
al., 2001). This strategy has been closely followed by the ECB over the five years of its
existence, gaining a high level of credibility (Issing, 2004).
The primary question that this study seeks to answer is whether a zero or a
positive inflation target is desirable. In particular, it is recognized that over the sample
period there was not in place any convergence of policies to achieve the EMU.
Moreover, one may argue that finding a positive inflation target ‘better’ may merely
reflect the fact that the average inflation rate over this period was closer to 4% than it
was to 2% or 0%.3 What merely this study does is to inquire how EU’s economic
performance would have changed if various inflation targets had been adopted. Thus,
the approach is to think through three hypothetical scenarios of inflation targeting by
the EU countries and use the thought exercise to gain a better understanding of the
output gains. Although inflation targeting offers greater credibility to the European
monetary authorities let us not forget that the euro area countries have already a high
degree of credibility. Therefore, the results will be very fruitful if they support that
those countries incur a cost of a loss of output against the benefit of higher credibility in
their fight to inflation. The additional merit of this study is that for the first time it
employs European aggregate data in order to evaluate the aforementioned alternative
inflation targets. Although the analysis is novel in the above respects, in most other
ways it is entirely conventional. It makes use of standard and popular monetary policy
rules, i.e. forward looking rules, while it uses standard econometric techniques, i.e.
instrumental variables as well as simulation results.

5

6

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
specification of an open macro model, while Section 3 presents and discusses the
empirical analysis. Finally, concluding comments are presented in Section 4.
2. The Model
2.1 The benchmark model
We adopt a version of the IS-LM-AS model proposed by Clarida et al. (1999),
McCallum and Nelson (1999), Woodford (2000), and Clifton et al. (2001). The first
equation describes the IS curve through which the behavior of output is dominated by
movements of the real interest rate:
yt = a yt-1 + b rt + εt, 0≤a<1, b<0

(1)

where y equals the output gap, r equals the real interest rate (the difference between the
nominal interest rate and expected inflation, ε equals a demand disturbance term that
obeys εt = µεt-1 + λ1t, with 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 and λ1t is an i.i.d. random variable with zero mean
and variance σλ12. Theoretically, the negative b reflects intertemporal substitution of
consumption. According to equation (1), interest rates influence aggregate demand
through consumption as well as investment. Finally, lagged output, indicating
persistence effects, affects current output (Fuhrer, 1996).
The second equation describes the LM curve (Haldane and Salmon, 1995):
mt-pt = c0 + c1 yt + c2 it + vt, c1>0, c2 <0

(2)

where v equals a monetary disturbance term.
The third equation captures an augmented Phillips curve as follows:
πt = k0 + k1 πt+1e + k2 πt-1 + k3 yt-1 + θt

(3)

where π denotes inflation, πe denotes expected inflation, and θ denotes a real
disturbance term (cost-push shock, Svensson, 2000) that obeys θt = νθt-1 + λ2t, with 0 ≤
ν ≤ 1 and λ2t is an i.i.d. random variable with zero mean and variance σλ22. Equation
(3) describes a traditional expectations augmented Phillips curve (Blanchard, 1997).
Inflation is affected by expected inflation at t+1. Moreover, persistence effects exist,
since lagged inflation enters explicitly in equation (3) (Fuhrer, 1996; Clarida et al.,
1999).
The fourth equation describes the formation of expectations:
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πte = g0 + g1 πt-1e + g2 πt-1 + ηt

(4)

where η is a random term. Equation (4) yields after recursive substitution:
∞

∞

πte = g0/(1-g1) + g2 Σg1i πt-i + Σg1i ηt-i
i=1
i=0

(4a)

According to (4a), expected inflation reflects past values of inflation (backward-looking
expectations). Of course, the sum of gi coefficients must fall below one in absolute
value for stability. Equations (3) and (4a), in turn, imply that inflation depends entirely
on past values of inflation and the output gap.4
Policy rules
To evaluate the case of inflation targeting, we introduce explicit policy rules. The
monetary authorities affect the inflation rate through a policy instrument, a short-term
nominal interest rate. This last hypothesis comes against the usual assumption that the
monetary authorities choose directly the inflation rate after observing the random
shocks (Ruge-Murcia, 2003). Svensson (1999b, 2003) argues that a rule is nothing more
than a commitment by a central bank to adjust its policy instrument as necessary to
ensure that at a particular point of time the economy’s future evolution satisfies a
certain targeting criterion, e.g. inflation. Moreover, Taylor (2000) argues that a rule is
not a mathematical economic expression used in a mechanical fashion, but it is used as a
benchmark guideline through which sometimes a certain degree of discretion seems to
be crucial.
Within a regime of inflation targeting a critical question focuses on whether a
point target or a range around a point target is the most desirable. Usually, the difficulty
in forecasting future inflation as well as the paucity of successful predictions about the
effects of monetary policy on inflation has suggested the adoption of a range around the
target (Longworth and Freedman, 2000). The wider the range is, the higher the
likelihood that the monetary authorities keep inflation within the range and the lower
the likelihood of altering inflationary expectations and economic behavior is in the long
run. For empirical purposes, we use three different inflation targets, i.e. 0, 2, and 4
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percent. In addition, we also assume that the monetary authorities raise the interest rate
whenever the actual inflation in the previous period exceeds target inflation.
We use the model described by equations (1) through (3) to compare the
performance of the above policy rules. We adopt a standard loss function, where the
central bank dislikes high inflation rate, large output gaps, and large interest rate
fluctuations. Therefore, following Woodford (2003) and McCallum and Nelson (2004),
the central bank’s loss function (described by a symmetric quadratic parameterization
functional form) at time t equals:
Minimize Et Σj=0 βj ½ [(πt+j-π*)2 + ω1 yt+j2 + ω2 (it+j-it+j-1)2]
where, it is the central bank’s policy rate, E is the expectation operator, ω1 and ω2 are
positive parameters (less, but not equal, than one), and β is the discount factor. The
parameters ω1 and ω2 show the policymakers’ aversion to output deviations from its
potential level and to interest-rate level fluctuations.
The policymaker minimizes the loss function subject to model described by
equations (1) through (3) (as in Clarida et al., 1999; Peersman and Smets, 1999;
Svensson, 1999c). By solving the policymakers’ optimization problem and through the
first order conditions we get a non-linear rule, which responds to the developments in
the economy. The first order conditions are:
-βj Et(πt+j-π*) – ω1βjEtyt+j – βj-1c1 – βj-1(c1+bk3)/k1 + βjω2it+j + k1βj-1ω2it+j-1 + βj-1b=0 (4b)
then we can solve for the reaction function instrument and get:
it+j = [c1/βω2+b/βω2+(c1+b k3)/βk1ω2)] + (1/ω2) Et(πt+j-π*) + ω1/ω2 Etyt+j + k1/β it+j-1 (4c)
Τhis study also used two major alternative policy rules,4 a forward looking rule
(FLR) (Henderson and Mckibbon, 1993; Clarida et al. 1999) and the spontaneous
adjustment rule (SAR) (Clarida et al. 1999)5. According to this set-up, the SAR rule
indicates that inflation targeting takes into consideration output changes and changes in
expected inflation. Both rules include a lagged interest rate term, whose interpretation is
in terms of interest rate smoothing. According to Levin et al. (1999), rules that
incorporate interest rate smoothing and respond to output gap changes as well as to
deviations of inflation from its target perform relatively well. Moreover, Blinder (1999)
argues that interest rate smoothing has received widespread practice in central banking,
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since central banks are potentially reluctant to change short-term interest rates by much
as this leads to substantial variations in the prices of outstanding debts. Goodfriend and
King (1997) and Jensen (2002) argue that forward-looking behavior really matters in
private agent’s decisions. Moreover, the superiority of the forward-looking type of rules
lies on the fact that it captures forward-looking behavior on the part of the central bank
(Clarida et al. 2000). The two alternative policy rules considered are as follows:
it = a5 + a6 (Etπt+1 – π*) + a7 Etyt+1+ a8 it-1

forward looking

(5)

it = a9 + a10 (Etπt+1 – π*) + a11 yt + a12 it-1

spontaneous adjustment

(6)

According to those rules, it is set each period so as to equate the expected value of π to a
chosen target value π* (McCallum and Nelson, 1999). The rules (5) and (6) provide
benchmarks for evaluating actual inflation and output performance with “optimal”
performance in the euro area.
III. Empirical Analysis
Data
Quarterly observations on real output (Y) measured by GDP at 1995 prices, core prices
(CP) measured by core harmonized CPI and defined as the overall index excluding
energy and food, the interbanking nominal interest rate (i), the money supply (M)
measured as M1, and unemployment (u) measured as the unemployment percentage rate
were obtained from various issues of the OECD Main Economic Indicators CD-Rom
over the period 1974-2001. The sample includes the following European countries:
Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy, Luxemburg,
Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Finland, and Greece. Some
countries in the sample performed under inflation targeting even before the euro era, i.e.
Finland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. For empirical purposes, the output
gap was estimated as a residual variable through the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with
smoothing parameter=1,600 (Hodrick and Prescott, 1981).
The relevant variables at the European level are constructed using a weighting
and aggregation system proposed by Maulon and Sarda (1999). According to this
method, we convert all national variables into a chosen currency (i.e. the euro). The
method requires the selection of the appropriate exchange rate. We employ the
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rate in our calculations.
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Inflation is measured as the differences in logarithmic prices and the real interest
rate, (r), equals the nominal interest rate minus expected inflation (i.e., the Fisher
interest rate equation). Equation (4a) suggests using the Box and Jenkins technique for
the estimation of expected inflation. That analysis suggests that European inflation
follows an ARMA(2, 0) model over the period under investigation (within-the-sampleforecasting). That model generates our expected inflation rate series. In addition, Box
and Jenkins analysis recommends an ARMA(1, 0) model that generates within-thesample forecasting values for expected output (to be used in the estimation of the firstorder condition out of the optimization problem).
Although most countries target the CPI (Roger and Stone, 2004), core inflation
targets play key roles in policy formulation. Core inflation measures remove volatile
components from the overall price index, such as food and energy items. Bryan and
Cecchetti (1994) and Roger (1997) recommend such price data so that policy makers
can set credible inflation target bands in the process of a successful monetary policy.6
Folkertsma and Hubrich (2001) demonstrate that overall price indices reflect every
shock impinging on the economy, which turns the implementation of an efficient
inflation monetary policy into a nightmare for the central banks. Cogley and Sargent
(2000) and Cecchetti and Wynne (2003) also support the idea of a core index for
monetary policy strategy within the ECB (i.e., adjusting short-term interest rates so that
inflation converges to its target in the long run). Moreover, Vega and Wynne (2003)
argue that a core index provides comparability across all EU members, while Breuss
(2002) also argues that monetary policy should orient towards core inflation in the
Euroland, since the exclusion of such volatile items as energy and food lowers the
volatility of inflation itself, resulting in lower interest rates and, therefore, higher
income outcomes. Finally, Bagliano et al. (2002) argue that core inflation data proves
more important, since such data are constructed through a forward-looking method.
Throughout the paper lower case letters denote variables expressed in logarithms, while
all estimates and tests were derived using the econometric software of RATS, version
4.2, and that of MicroFit, version 5.1.
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Comparative output and inflation results: euro area data
Table 1 reports estimates of the model parameters through the first order
condition (4b) using the generalized method of moments (GMM) methodology
proposed by Hansen and Singleton (1982). The estimation of the model (1) through (3)
gives the estimates of certain parameters, which are very close to their counterparts
estimated through GMM. From GMM estimates we will use the parameters involved in
the interest rate rule. Three lags of the short-term interest rate (in a stationary form),
inflation, and output gap are included as instruments. According to Davidson and
MacKinnon (1993), in small samples efficiency gains from using more instruments are
obtained at the cost of a greater bias in the estimates. Thus, the number of instruments
was chosen to ensure parameter identification while minimizing the bias. Moreover, as
a quantitative definition of inflation targeting, we impose the three alternative inflation
targets, i.e. 0 per cent, 2 per cent, and 4 per cent under the three alternative rules, i.e.,
backward, forward, and spontaneous. The J-statistic, which is asymptotically distributed
as a x2M-K distribution with M being the number of instruments and K the number of
parameters to be estimated, displays that the null hypothesis of valid over-identifying
restrictions is never rejected. In other words, the model seems to perform relatively
well.
Table 2 reports the estimated model. In particular, it reports the estimation of
equations (1) through (3) with the SURE methodology over the sample period. All
variables (except the output gap and inflation) have been measured as log-deviations
(except interest rates) from their steady-state values (unit root tests are available upon
request). The coefficients in equation (1) to (3) behave as expected from theory.
Sargan’s instrument validity tests indicate that the chosen instruments are independent
of the error term. The estimated model was used to generate artificial values for the
output gap and inflation in terms of mean and variances.
The results, reported in Table 2 suggest that both rules are a satisfactory
description of policy. In particular, the coefficients on output gap as well as on inflation
are statistically significant and show the correct sign. The smoothing interest rate
coefficient is ranging from 0.541 to 0.558, suggesting a high degree of interest rate
smoothing. It is also worth mentioning that the rules indicate that the current inflation or
11
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expected inflation coefficients are statistically significant and above unity, implying that
in the face of inflation, central banks raise interest rates enough to keep the real rate
constant and, thus, to curb inflationary pressures.
Following the estimation of the model (1) through (3), we incorporate the rules
built with the assistance of the GMM estimations and then we generate artificial values
for the output gap and inflation (equations (1) and (3), respectively). Table 3 reports the
relative performance under the two alternative policy rules, along with the actual
performance. We employ a zero-, a two-, and a four-percent target inflation rates. The
counterfactual experiments address the following question: How would the output gap
and the inflation rate have evolved over the sample period, if the monetary policy
makers had followed each of the two optimal policy rules throughout that period?
Several interesting results emerge. First, a negative trade-off exists between the
mean output gap and the mean inflation rate as well as between the output-gap and
inflation-rate variances. That first trade-off suggests a short-run Phillips curve. The
second negative trade-off between the variances of the output gap and the inflation rate
appears frequent in the literature (Fuhrer, 1997). Ball (1997) and Bean (1998) argue that
the monetary authorities find it extremely difficult to satisfy simultaneously both their
output-gap and inflation-rate targets, since the economy continuously experiences
various supply and demand shocks. Therefore, the authorities must decide how fast to
correct any divergence of the inflation rate from its target (i.e., achieve as low a
variance of inflation around its target at the expense of a higher output gap variance or
maintain a low output variance and accept a higher inflation-rate variance around its
target). In other words, the monetary authorities reach optimal decisions through a
trade-off between the volatilities of the two variables under investigation. Such a policy
menu represents an optimal policy frontier, given the relative weighting of these two
variables in the loss function.
Second, the optimal policy rules suggest that the forward-looking rule dominates
in most respects the other rule. The forward-looking rule exhibits higher mean output,
lower mean inflation, lower output-gap variance, and lower inflation variance than the
alternative rule. The importance of forward-looking expectations becomes substantial in
successful policy implementation, which favorably affects the credibility of the
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monetary authorities (i.e., the ECB). Moreover, Batini and Haldane (1998) and Amano
et al. (1999) also show that forward-looking rules prove more efficient, in terms of
lower mean and variable inflation. The results in Table 3 support those arguments.
Robustness analysis: Country data instead of euro area data
This section examines the robustness of the results after disaggregating to the country
level. In particular, we apply the same method to Germany, France, Spain and Greece.
In each case, we reestimate the macroeconometric model, equations (1) through (3) (the
results are available upon request).
Table 4 reports the output gap and inflation results. They show that the findings
at the aggregate level generally remain valid for three out of the four countries under
investigation (i.e., Germany, France and Spain). Greece, however, exhibits different
results. In particular, the mean output gap and the mean inflation rate correlate
positively, unlike the negative correlation for the aggregate results.
If we accept the conclusions of Akerlof et al. (2000) (i.e., unemployment
remains below the natural rate only if inflation rates are kept (moderately) above zero),
then our 4% inflation targeting for Germany, France and Spain could lubricate their
economies through the flexibility of real wages, resulting in a lower, more stable, output
gap (see also, Wyplosz, 2001). In contrast, a higher inflation-targeting regime seems
inappropriate for the Greek economy as it also increases output-gap. To some extent,
our empirical findings converge on Svensson’s (1999b) conclusions that higher
‘flexible’ inflation targeting for certain European economies will gradually stabilize
output and unemployment, while inflation variability should fall below the case of
‘strict’ inflation targeting (current policy). In Greece public investments can sustain
growth. Public spending and growing deficits shift the aggregate demand and produce
higher inflation and inflation expectations, which is a destabilizing process. In such a
perverse situation, Greece must closely watch labor productivity and unit labor costs.
Nevertheless, since Greece is a relatively closed economy in the euro area, only a
‘strict’ low inflation targeting with frequent intervention of monetary authorities can
stabilize the output gap against aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks.
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Robustness analysis: Alternative measures of the output gap
The literature on optimal monetary policy pays special attention to the methodology
used to measure the output gap (Ball, 1997; Clarida et al. 1999; Orphanides, 1999;
Rudebusch, 1999; Svenson and Woodford 2000; Camba-Mendez and RodriguezPalenzuela, 2003). To test the robustness of our results we use an alternative method of
estimating the output gap. In particular, we adopt a multivariate time-series model.
Following the method of Apel and Jansson (1999) and Camba-Mendez and RodriguezPalenzuela (2003), a three-variable system –real output, inflation, and unemploymentgenerates measures of the output gap. We employ a structural vector autoregressive
(SVAR) model with certain long-run restrictions. In particular, inflation only responds
to its own structural shocks, real output only responds to its own and inflation shocks,
while unemployment responds to three shocks simultaneously. After estimating the
three-variable system (results available on request) and getting the new detrended
output gap data, we repeat our analysis and Table 5 reports the results. They nearly
match those reached in Table 3.
In addition to VAR-constructed gap measures, it is useful to use ‘off-the-shelf’
measures, e.g. OECD output gaps. After obtaining those measures for the Europe-12
group from the OECD Main Economic Indicators CD-ROM and over the period 19802002, the results are reported in Table 6. They do not point any differences to those
reached before (Table 5). An inflation target away from zero seems to be the
appropriate policy followed, since it exhibits superiority, in terms of lower output gaps.
Robustness analysis: An alternative sample period-The 1990s
Inflation in Europe was much higher in the past, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. As
such, reasonable inflation targets for today may produce unreasonable targets for the
past. Also, the variation of inflation across European countries fell dramatically in
recent years. Some even argue that cyclical fluctuations in the 1990s were smaller than
those in the 1980s (Bernanke et al., 1999; Cecchetti and Ehrmann, 2000; Arestis et al.,
2002). Thus, it is difficult to determine whether lower fluctuations reflect inflation
targeting or more favorable shocks. We address this concern by reestimating and
simulating the model only during the 1990s. In particular, we estimated equations (1)
through (3) from 1990:1 through 2001:4 and then we generated in-sample forecasting
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values. Table 7 reports the results. They are consistent with an inflation target away
from zero that seems to be a successful regime choice, in terms of lower output gaps. In
addition, the average output gap and the average inflation rate for the simulated
performance are lower in the 1990s than in the full sample findings, implying that the
implementation of monetary policy under inflation targeting still receives favorable
support even within an environment with less frequent economic shocks.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Our paper contributes to the assessment of inflation targeting by assessing the merits of
alternative policy rules and alternative inflation targets in a macroeconometric model.
Our study uses for the first time European aggregate data to evaluate the performance of
these alternative policy rules and alternative inflation targets where the European
monetary authorities employ a loss function on deviations of output, inflation, and
interest rates from their target values.
Two specific policy rules were tested, a forward-looking rule and a spontaneousadjustment rule. The empirical findings indicated that forward-looking rules contributed
significantly to macroeconomic stability, resulting in lower business cycle fluctuations
and increased monetary policy credibility. Three alternative inflation targets were
tested, i.e. a zero percent, a two percent, and a four percent inflation rate. Except in the
case of Greece, we find a negative correlation between the average output gap and the
average inflation rate across the three different inflation targets both for aggregate and
disaggregated data. Higher inflation targets lead to lower average output gaps and
higher average inflation. At the same time, the counterfactual experiments indicate a
negative correlation between the output-gap variance and the inflation-rate variance
across the three different inflation targets. Higher inflation targets lead to higher
inflation-rate variances and lower output-gap variances. For Greece, we find a positive
correlation between the average output gap and the average inflation rate. But the
negative correlation between the output-gap variance and the inflation-rate variance
continues to hold.
As an agenda of future research, the authors plan to extend the policy rule
analysis by incorporating exchange rate as well as financial variables, since inflation
targeting acts as a pre-requisite for strengthening financial markets and through them
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the real economy. The central banks that implement an inflation targeting strategy think
primarily of reducing the distortions on financial markets caused by monetary policy.

NOTES
1. Since monetary and fiscal policy affect aggregate demand, policies designed to
stabilize inflation (price level) will automatically stabilize real GDP when the economy
only faces aggregate demand shocks. If, however, the economy primarily experiences
aggregate supply shocks, then stabilizing inflation (price level) will increase the
variability of real output.
2. Price stability was Friedman’s suggestion. The control of the price level was
Keynes’s concern through certain guidelines, albeit the control was not proved to be
very successful. However, as variation in aggregate demand cases the GDP volatility,
price stability cannot be maintained without losses in output and employment since
markets are ripped off their dynamism. Producers cannot respond to increased demand
unless they are caught by surprise that reinforces their tentative motivation.
3. Akerlof et al. (1996, 2000) emphasize that some inflation lubricates the economy and
allows for more flexible adjustments in real wages. Wyplosz (2001) also argues that the
European Central Bank by announcing low inflation targets (e.g. 2 percent) increases
rigidities in the economy and thus leads to higher structural unemployment. In contrast,
Issing (2001) argues that low inflation contributes to the elimination of money illusion,
which, in turn, lessens the need for positive inflation rates to ‘lubricate’ the system.
Furthermore, low inflation targets also expose the economy to the risk that inflation
may drop below 0 percent, a dangerous situation that can push the economy into a
deflationary spiral.
4. According to Peersman and Smets (1999), the external transmission channel (the
exchange rate between the dollar and the DM) does not appear to be significant.
Although this could raise some serious criticisms, we consider that the euro area
functions as a relatively closed economy.
5. We use simple rules that ignore a large amount of information about the economy,
such as variables representing, labor and financial markets, for example. The benefit of
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a simple rule comes from the parsimony in the specification but the cost emerges
because of the inability to take advantage of this information. Levin et al. (1999),
Dennis (2002), and Levin and Williams (2003) find that only small improvements in
performance exist from moving to more-complicated rules. By contrast, Finan and
Tetlow (1999) reach the opposite result.
6. Others recommend alternative and more sophisticated measures of inflation for an
inflation targeting monetary policy regime, such as trimmed mean indices (Bryan and
Cecchetti, 1994; Bryan et al., 1999). The lack of such data for all members of the
Euroland requires our analysis to be based on original core price index data.
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Table 1. GMM estimates
_____________________________________________________________________________
b
k1
k3
ω2
ω1
β
J
Coefficients:
c1
_____________________________________________________________________________
Rules-Targets
Forward-0%
Forward-2%
Forward-4%
Spontaneous-0%
Spontaneous-2%
Spontaneous-4%

0.56
(3.98)*
0.57
(4.15)*
0.60
(4.71)*
0.53
(3.83)*
0.58
(4.02)*
0.57
(3.90)*

-0.106
0.49
0.128
0.47
(-4.11)* (4.25)*
(4.52)*
(4.31)*
-0.109
0.54
0.134
0.48
(-3.97)* (4.18)*
(4.20)*
(4.19)*
-0.107
0.57
0.137
0.55
(-4.28)*
(4.39)*
(3.97)*
(4.63)*
-0.096
0.48
0.119
0.57
(-3.47)** (4.14)*
(3.55)** (3.86)*
-0.103
0.50
0.125
0.56
(-3.87)*
(3.81)* (4.19)*
(3.45)**
-0.102
0.49
0.126
0.59
(4.03)*
(3.39)** (4.84)*
(4.09)*

0.13
(4.71)*
0.14
(5.07)*
0.15
(4.19)*
0.12
(4.53)*
0.13
(4.71)*
0.14
(4.22)*

Notes: Figures in parentheses denote t-statistics, while those in brackets denote p-values.
* significant at the 1 percent level
** significant at the 5 percent level
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0.97 [0.55]
(3.98)*
0.98 [0.57]
(4.39)*
0.97 [0.59]
(4.84)*
0.95 [0.43]
(4.67)*
0.96 [0.48]
(4.17)*
0.95 [0.46]
(4.55)*
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Table 2. Multivariate (IV) estimations under alternative policy rules and inflation
targets
Model Estimations
Equation (1)
yt = 0.57 yt-1 – 0.108 rt
(4.29)*
(-5.11)*
instruments: constant, yt-2, yt-3, rt-1, rt-2
Equation (2)
(mt-pt) = 0.084 + 0.59 yt – 0.114 it
(3.92)* (4.55)* (-4.64)*
instruments: constant, (m-p)t-1, yt-1, yt-2, it-2
Equation (3)
πt = 0.0109 + 0.53 πt-1 + 0.41 πt-2 + 0.131 yt-1
(3.68)* (3.95)* (3.49)* (4.12)*
instruments: constant, πt-3, πt-4, yt-2, yt-3, yt-4

Sargan’s test
0.0214[0.87]

_
R2
0.54

0.0302[0.66]

0.78

0.0318[0.58]

0.76

Rules (through the first order conditions)
Forward-0%
it = 3.45 + 2.13 πt+1e + 0.28 yt+1 e + 0.546 it-1
Forward-2%
it = 3.17 + 2.08 (πt+1e – 0.02) + 0.29 yt+1 e + 0.541 it-1
Forward-4%
it = 2.84 + 1.82 (πt+1e – 0.04) + 0.27 yt+1 e + 0.546 it-1
Spontaneous-0%
it = 2.80 + 1.75 πt+1e + 0.21 yt + 0.558 it-1
Spontaneous-2%
it = 3.00 + 1.79 (πt+1e – 0.02) + 0.23 yt + 0.552 it-1
Spontaneous-4%
it = 2.87 + 1.69 (πt+1e – 0.04) + 0.24 yt + 0.558 it-1
Notes: Numbers in parentheses denote t-statistics, while numbers in brackets denote p-values. Sargan
refers to the Sargan’s instrument validity test.
* significant at the 1-percent level
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Table 3. Economic performance of policy rules under alternative inflation targets (core
price data-HP filter for output gap)
Rule

Output

Inflation
Variance
16.23

Mean
-0.6

Variance
3.66

Mean
3.2

Artificial data
FLR-0
FLR-2
FLR-4

-1.4
-1.1
-0.6

2.52
2.31
2.01

2.5
2.8
3.4

11.52
12.47
13.61

SAR-0
SAR-2
SAR-4

-1.4
-1.0
-0.7

3.35
2.83
2.28

3.5
3.6
4.2

12.58
13.90
16.09

Actual data

Notes: The simulation covers the period 1974:1 – 2001:4. The mean variables are expressed as a percent.
The suffixes 0, 2, and 4 after the acronyms of FLR, and SAR indicate the percent inflation-rate target
(i.e., 0 percent, 2 percent, and 4 percent).
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Table 4. Economic performance of policy rules under alternative inflation targets
(Germany, France, Spain and Greece)
Rule

Output

Inflation
Variance

Mean

Variance

Mean

Germany
Actual data

-1.1

6.51

3.1

3.63

Artificial data
FLR-0
FLR-2
FLR-4

-1.6
-1.0
-0.8

5.48
4.51
4.06

2.3
3.1
3.3

1.82
3.04
3.84

SAR-0
SAR-2
SAR-4

-1.7
-1.4
-1.1

6.51
5.29
4.61

3.5
4.2
4.7

1.95
3.31
3.68

France
Actual data

-1.2

3.98

5.7

20.72

Artificial data
FLR-0
FLR-2
FLR-4

-1.5
-1.1
-0.9

3.29
2.53
2.32

3.8
4.3
4.9

16.26
19.08
24.12

SAR-0
SAR-2
SAR-4

-1.6
-1.4
-1.1

4.17
3.55
2.48

4.4
5.3
5.8

20.59
26.32
32.09

Spain
Actual data

-1.9

6.52

9.4

38.94

Artificial data
FLR-0
FLR-2
FLR-4

-1.1
-0.9
-0.7

5.69
4.41
4.08

8.1
8.5
9.0

26.39
32.11
36.49

SAR-0
SAR-2
SAR-4

-2.7
-2.2
-1.8

6.81
5.75
4.60

8.7
9.6
10.3

33.18
40.23
45.36

27

28

Table 4 continued
______________________________________________________________________
Greece
Actual data

-0.5

9.97

14.6

47.61

Artificial data
FLR-0
FLR-2
FLR-4

-0.7
-1.5
-1.8

9.22
7.42
6.39

12.4
14.4
17.2

37.19
43.85
48.12

SAR-0
SAR-2
SAR-4

-1.7
-2.2
-2.8

13.07
12.24
8.84

13.8
15.5
20.8

41.97
48.53
52.77

Notes: See Table 3.
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Table 5. Economic performance of policy rules under alternative inflation targets (core
price data-SVAR filter for output gap)
Rule

Output

Inflation
Variance
16.23

Mean
-0.6

Variance
3.66

Mean
3.2

Artificial data
FLR-0
FLR-2
FLR-4

-1.4
-1.1
-0.6

3.32
2.49
2.12

2.1
2.4
3.1

10.44
14.19
16.02

SAR-0
SAR-2
SAR-4

-2.1
-1.3
-0.9

3.57
2.82
2.40

2.6
3.6
4.1

12.15
14.79
18.05

Actual data

Notes: See Table 3.

Table 6. Economic performance of policy rules under alternative inflation targets (core
price data: OECD output-gap measures-1980-2002)
Rule

Output

Inflation
Variance
15.12

Mean
-0.5

Variance
2.89

Mean
3.0

Artificial data
FLR-0
FLR-2
FLR-4

-1.2
-1.0
-0.5

2.62
2.49
2.25

1.3
1.7
3.0

11.03
12.57
14.58

SAR-0
SAR-2
SAR-4

-2.4
-1.5
-0.8

3.28
2.79
2.57

2.8
3.4
3.9

12.69
15.21
15.94

Actual data

Notes: OECD measures are relative to the EU-12 group. See also Table 3.
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Table 7. Economic performance of policy rules under alternative inflation targets (the
1990s-core inflation-HP filter for output gap)
Rule

Output

Inflation
Variance
13.37

Mean
-0.4

Variance
2.19

Mean
2.7

Artificial data
FLR-0
FLR-2
FLR-4

-1.3
-1.1
-0.7

2.57
2.30
2.16

1.9
2.3
2.9

10.64
12.91
14.22

SAR-0
SAR-2
SAR-4

-1.8
-1.2
-0.8

3.51
2.89
2.44

2.3
2.7
3.6

11.32
15.14
16.71

Actual data

Notes: See Table 3.
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